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Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System
Trevor C. W. Farrow1
At every level of the system – starting with 
the federal government itself2 - a strong 
preference is being voiced for getting cases 
out of the public stream and into a typically 
private, or at least confidential, alternative 
stream.  Small claims courts3, provincial 
superior courts4, the Federal Court5, 
and provincial and federal administrative 
tribunals6 have all developed alternatives to 
traditional, more formal investigation and 
hearing processes.  These are in addition to 
the already available informal private tools 
of negotiation, mediation and arbitration 
typically available outside of a formal court 
or tribunal setting.7 
There are many stated benefits to this 
trend of privatization.  In terms of the 
formal court or tribunal-connected tools, 
the overwhelming justification for their 
promotion is system efficiency: backlog reduction and savings 
of time, money and other resources.  In terms of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) tools generally, proponents point 
to advantages including reduced costs and delays,8 the ability 
to choose laws, procedures and judges and the potential 
to maintain relationships.  Typically the most important 
advantage, however, is the ability to avoid public scrutiny.  
When a dispute involves the private rights of A v. B, and 
further, when two “consenting adults” (including corporations) 
have chosen to move their dispute off the busy docket of our 
public court system and into the private boardroom of an 
arbitrator or mediator, current views suggest that justice is 
being served.  The argument is that the resolution of disputes 
– like other goods and services – should not be deprived 
of the benefits of freedom of movement and contract in an 
efficiency-seeking, innovative and expanding market economy.
These purported benefits, however, do not come without 
costs.  Without public scrutiny – through open court 
processes, the publication of precedents and the application 
of case law to the facts to be adjudicated – there is a 
real danger that parties, particularly those with power, 
will increasingly use this privatizing system in order to 
circumvent public policies, accountability and notions of 
basic procedural fairness.
These procedural concerns are clearly significant.  In 
addition, however, there is a more fundamental concern at 
issue: democracy - and in particular, the way in which we 
regulate ourselves in democratic, common law communities.
Law Making in a Democracy
Law in a democratic society is primarily made through 
the tools of legislation and adjudication.  Recognizing that 
adjudication plays an ordering role in society both in terms 
of resolving individual disputes and, more 
broadly, modifying societal behaviour, both 
public and private processes of adjudication 
count as lawmaking tools.9
There is normally no issue as to the 
democratic legitimacy of the typical 
legislative process.  Further, in terms of 
adjudication, contrary to the concerns of 
“judicial activism” critics, decisions made in 
open court, by appointed judges, pursuant 
to fair procedural regimes, also, in my 
view, usually accord with constitutional 
principles characterized by democratic 
notions of transparency, accountability 
and the rule of law.  Where a democracy 
deficit comes into play, however, is not 
in open court with “activist” judges, 
but rather when the important societal 
ordering tool of adjudication goes 
underground to private arenas, without the guarantee of 
the rule of law badges of procedural fairness, transparency 
and independence of the decision maker.  When decisions 
are made in these private circumstances, we often do not 
know what they are.  And in any event, to the extent that we 
do know, (which knowledge brings the broader behaviour 
modification element of adjudication into play) we typically 
have no record or guarantee of the fairness of the procedural 
or substantive legal regimes that were employed to reach a 
given result.  What we are doing with our increasing reliance 
on ADR, then, is privatizing a significant way in which we 
make law and order our public and private affairs.  
So why are we so acquiescent and even seemingly 
disinterested in the current move to privatize the adjudicative 
aspects of our law-making tools?  That, in my view, is the 
democracy deficit with which we should be concerned.  With 
limited exceptions, we expect public hearings, precedent and 
transparency in traditional court proceedings.  Why then 
– other than for efficiency and privacy interest preferences – 
are we so deferential to the concern of privacy when it comes 
to the use of alternative dispute resolution tools?  
Reclaiming The Rule Of Law In Dispute 
Resolution Practices
In opposition to those who relegate public procedures 
honouring basic rule of law values to the background 
in favour of modern, consensually-based private dispute 
resolution regimes, I argue for increased transparency and 
accountability in current and emerging approaches to dispute 
resolution.  The potential strengths of dispute resolution 
alternatives, particularly in free market economies must, of 
course, be recognized.   When carefully crafted, however, 
such mechanisms can effectively secure rule of law values, 
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while still facilitating many of the efficiency and accessibility 
goals of more privatized dispute resolution processes.  
But when it comes to a conflict between cost saving and 
efficiency on the one hand and transparent procedural justice 
on the other – particularly in cases involving issues of public 
interest – the latter must always trump.10
There is no more important topic in law than the procedural 
rules by which our democratic system operates.  Important 
parts of that system are the processes by which disputes are 
resolved.  Without sound, accountable, yet creative dispute 
resolution processes, we potentially jeopardize individual 
rights, together with underlying collective democratic values.  
In my view, current trends of privatization in the context of 
dispute resolution processes, are potentially putting those 
rights and values at risk.  As such, we need to question our 
current trend of privileging the private over the public.  And 
in any event, if we are going to continue experimenting 
with privatized civil justice – and it is likely that we will 
(and is some cases should) – we should only do so with full 
disclosure to the public regarding the rationalizations for, 
and implications of, these tools.  To date, the public is largely 
unaware of the aggressive and systematic privatization of its 
public civil justice system.  The resulting democratic deficit 
jeopardizes one of the foundational tenets of our civil justice 
system and our common law system of governance as a 
whole.
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